S SINCE THE SHOCK OF THE 1965
North American collapse, multimillion dollar collapses throughout the world have doubled in number every successive decade. Even now, no effective measures are provided against such severe unforeseen disturbances, and system operators, without automatic supports, are unable to stem the threat. Yet two identical disturbances on 2 and 3 July 1996, when load shedding averted the previous day's system collapse, suggest that there is a way out of this deadlock.
Rather than the morass of postdisturbance information, a new approach restricts postdisturbance information to a handful of items, capable of being identified by simple pattern recognition software. The success of the approach rests on assiduously investigating postdisturbance phenomena and charting changes of active and reactive power that culminate in collapse. Once the precise processes are correctly understood, measures and timing of their responses can be directed by a distributed intelligence
Incidents on 2 and 3 July 1996
Incidents on two successive days have confirmed that targeted load shedding can sustain voltage stability and avert system collapse.
July Incident
The first incident occurred at 2:24 p.m. during an extremely hot summer day on 2 July 1996 with a flashover from a tree to an adjacent line. This 234-mi 345-kV line connects Jim Bridger Power Station in Wyoming to Kinport substation in Idaho. A protection malfunction tripped a parallel line, leaving only one 345-kV line to transmit the power station output to Idaho. In spite of the severity of this multiple contingency, the North American Western Interconnection remained intact for 23 s when it disintegrated, interrupting 2 million consumers and closing 11 power stations.
At 2:04 p.m. on 3 July, an identical disturbance occurred, with the essential difference that a large generator in Idaho was returned to service, thereby sustaining voltages in the affected area for some minutes. Power station operators promptly reduced generator excitation currents. This action further reduced voltages in Boise, prompting operators to shed 700 MW, thereby safeguarding the North Western American interconnection. The reasons this strategy succeeded are provided.
System Planning Approach
Why has the power industry not been able to learn from this incident to devise measures for preventing system voltage instability? The reason for this conundrum has been the power industry's inability to recognize that with its evolution, the critical requirement now is to sustain the integrity of the interconnected grid. Yet system planning criteria have changed little from when individual utilities were self-sufficient in generation. Present planning criteria involve an assessment of single (and sometimes double) contingencies at peak and then systematic studies of those that could endanger the system. The deficiency of this approach can be seen with a 30 element network for which 900 outages would be assessed (30 single and 29 × 30 double contingencies) but 24,360 triple and 657,720 quadruple contingencies are ignored. Between 1984-1991, a National Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) survey found that 70% of severe incidents were worsened when protections acted, demonstrating the inadequacy of planning approaches.
Another Direction
When an extreme contingency strikes, the subsequent plethora of extra information sent to control centers only creates confusion. Present research efforts are devoted to unscrambling this morass with a computer program that aims to initiate responses from the main control center. I firmly believe that this approach cannot succeed.
Rather than untangling the mass of postdisturbance information, efforts were focused on discovering the processes leading to collapse, particularly the final disruptive phase. Careful replication was needed of postdisturbance phenomena with accurate simulation of the dynamic changes of active and reactive power. This uncovered a handful of postdisturbance indicators, all concentrated in the affected region, and so provided the stepping-stone to a solution, using a distributed intelligence 
Investigating System Voltage Instability
Investigations of system voltage instability followed studies for determining reactive power requirements of the New South Wales (NSW) 330-kV network. The most onerous situation for reactive compensation was the loss of a 150-km 330-kV line at peak, with maximum 2,600 MW import from Hydro generators, 400 km from Sydney, the largest load center. Subsequent studies assessing the security of the 330-kV interconnection uncovered a bus coupler circuit-breaker failure that would take out two bus sections at a 330-kV substation and thereby open five 330-kV lines, including the critical 150-km line. This posed a challenge to devise a method of investigation and realistically modeling the dynamic postdisturbance reactive power changes.
Convergent Postdisturbance Load Flows
Automatic voltage regulators are able, for a limited time, to exceed rated excitation currents and, thereby, generators can provide the additional reactive power. Convergent load flow solutions, after the loss of five 330-kV lines, were achieved by freeing reactive outputs on generators, and the results provided the vital stepping-stone.
Postdisturbance Phase
In spite of its severity, the initial impact affected only a small region of the interconnected grid, close to the disturbance. The sudden large increase of reactive demand is predominantly caused by extra series reactive power losses on transmission lines whose greatly increased power flows met the demand abrogated by the lines lost with the disturbance. Substations supplied by these heavily loaded lines incurred a sudden, substantial voltage fall. This voltage reduction, within the affected region of the interconnected network, prompted automatic voltage regulators on rotating units to increase their outputs, thereby meeting the suddenly higher reactive power demand. Throughout the remainder of the interconnected grid, there were almost no discernable voltage reductions nor increases of rotating unit reactive power outputs. This state of affairs persisted, often for minutes, while the series of stochastic changes in the affected region continued. Initially these changes were caused by automatic transformer tap changing, and each step change increased consumer voltages and their demand, lowered the substation transmission voltages, and increased currents flowing on the incoming transmission lines.
Collapse Phase
The disruptive phase is triggered when just one unit's rotor overcurrent protection curtailed its reactive power output, rapidly setting off rotor overcurrent protections on adjacent units. Within seconds, transmission voltages fell sharply in the affected region, increasing transmission line currents as additional reactive power was drawn from previously unaffected parts of the grid.
How Is System Voltage Stability Sustained?
Voltage levels are quite different throughout the network, even under normal conditions. What produces this cohesionand system voltage stability-between these many disparate and apparently uncoordinated voltage control devices?
When investigating system voltage instability, varying amounts of reactive power were injected at selected transmission substations, and this showed a linear voltage versus reactive power response not only under normal conditions but even after severe disturbances. This linearity at all transmission substations provides the facility whereby coordination between the numerous reactive power controls is achieved. The linearity persists while reactive power outputs are not constrained, but it is lost when just one unit's output is curtailed. The fact that unit reactive outputs are not constrained when the disturbance strikes has two important ramifications: 1) power systems can in my view (continued from page 88) november/december 2006 function stably beyond the presently adopted limits, and 2) unit above-rated excitation offers additional time to take corrective measures.
System voltage stability needs actions that ensure no unit's excitation is curtailed.
System Protection Structure
When voltage instability is threatened, the impediment of excessive information is overcome by taking data just from the affected region, the sudden transmission substation voltage falls and the concurrent unit excitation increases. Timely load shedding at these substations would avert the action of rotor overcurrent protection by sharply reducing the reactive power losses. This is a simple strategy, but two vital questions remain unanswered before an effective system protection can be devised:
✔ How much time is available before load shedding needs to be activated? ✔ What amount of load must be shed to eliminate excessive excitation on any unit? Resolving these two questions has been the vital step for the system protection.
✔ The first issue requires the time until overcurrent protection will function on the most overexcited unit.
Monitoring each overexcited unit's rotor current and voltage can allow an associated microprocessor, in seconds, to evaluate when it reaches 130
• C (rated insulation). The least time evaluated would be used. ✔ A system planning program has been devised that can calibrate dangerous postdisturbance changes and also quantify the amount of load shedding at affected substations, thereby allowing system protection specifications to be determined. On 3 July, operators shed 700 MW of load at Boise and sustained voltage stability by the lucky chance of shedding an amount of load that correctly reduced currents on all overexcited units. For a successful system protection arrangement, determining the correct amount of load shedding cannot be left to chance.
Supply Industry Dividends
Unlike a prevailing research effort that postulates complicated software and yet-to-be-developed technologies, the proposal is intrinsically simple and would use available resources. The system protection could be established at a modest cost, using existing communication networks and a distributed intelligence with straightforward and highly reliable pattern recognition software. When put in place, the protection arrangement will more than pay for itself just by eliminating the line power flow limits presently adopted as a security measure against system voltage stability. However, the biggest dividend will be gained by finally being able to respond automatically to extreme contingencies that are causing growing numbers of multimillion dollar system collapses.
The essential features of the proposal are: 1) A handful of parameters and pattern recognition software gives a rapid warning. 2) This identification can be made no matter where the interconnection is struck. 3) Faster responses are directed to the affected region by a distributed intelligence. 4) Advantage is taken of the power system's initial resilience. 5) Less forceful measures are able to sustain system voltage stability. 6) Operators will no longer form the last and unsuccessful line of defense. A word of warning: the benefits to be gained for all electricity consumers from the proposed system protection arrangement cannot be achieved without the complete cooperation of all bodies that constitute the electricity supply industry.
